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THE GREAT WHITE FLEET SAILS TODAY?
Twenty-First-Century Logistics Lessons from the 1907–1909
Voyage of the Great White Fleet
Christopher McMahon

We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that is perfect in
every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary for
fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the
fighting, to carry coal [fuel] and supplies . . . and without these ships,
the Navy would be as helpless in case of war as we would be without the
battleships or the fighting ships of the Navy.

I

SENATOR FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS (D-NV),
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING, MARCH 1908

n the numerous conflicts since the founding of the republic, and in particular
since the late nineteenth century, the United States has relied on its ability to
project military power far from its shores. With the country isolated from much
of the world by massive oceans, America’s military has employed sealift and—to
some extent, since early in World War II—airlift to move troops, equipment, ammunition, and supplies around the world.1 The majority of this lift capacity has
been provided by commercial merchant vessels under the operational control of
the military.
World War II offers the most spectacular examChristopher J. McMahon currently holds the Mariple
of strategic lift in the history of warfare. Using
time Administration Emory S. Land Chair of Merhundreds of Army and Navy logistics vessels and
chant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College. He
is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
over five thousand merchant vessels, the United
at Kings Point, New York, and holds master’s degrees
States carried more than 132 million measurefrom American University, Long Island University,
2
and Starr King School. He is an unlimited master ment tons of cargo during the war. This included
mariner and a commissioned rear admiral, U.S.
the movement of nearly 1.4 million vehicles, two
Maritime Service. He has held several Senior Executhousand locomotives, and nearly eight million
tive Service positions with the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration.
soldiers, plus vast amounts of ammunition, supplies, and other equipment.3 As it mounted the
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largest naval armada in history, the U.S. Navy
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would have found it impossible to achieve its accomplishments in the Atlantic
and Pacific theaters without the thousands of Army and Navy logistics ships and
commercial merchant ships that supported the fleet.
Recognizing the direct relationship of logistics to the ability of the U.S. military to forward-deploy around the world and acknowledging the need to coordinate military lift capabilities for all the services, the U.S. Merchant Marine,
and the airline industry, the U.S. government created the U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM, or simply TRANSCOM) in 1987.4 TRANSCOM is
headquartered at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois and is a four-star unified command. TRANSCOM components include the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command
(AMC), the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
(SDDC), and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). Augmenting and
supporting MSC is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The RRF consists of government-owned ships that MARAD
and its contracted companies maintain in a ready status. These ships fall under
MSC’s operational control when activated and are used in sealift emergencies to
support all the armed services. For more than thirty years—through numerous
conflicts, military actions, and deployments—TRANSCOM and its component
commands (and MARAD’s RRF) have proved their efficiency and effectiveness.
They have played vital roles in the success of American military actions—in the
air, on land, and at sea.
Yet, as well as many military leaders and planners in all the services understand and appreciate the critical importance of sealift logistics, too often as time
passes some military professionals and politicians forget or overlook the lessons
learned from past logistics failures. We are again at a time in history when the
importance and vulnerability of sealift, for both military and commercial activities, need to be considered and reassessed. The voyage of the U.S. Navy’s Great
White Fleet around the world from December 1907 to February 1909 offers some
powerful lessons in this regard.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, European powers rushed
headlong into the building and expanding of global empires around the world.5
As the twentieth century dawned, with most of the United States and its territories explored, America too launched itself into imperialist actions as it sought
great-power status. A particular manifestation was the Great White Fleet’s voyage, which seemingly proved that America’s navy could project power forward
to any region of the world and defend the country’s newly acquired overseas
territories and its trade. Credit can be given to President Theodore Roosevelt
for envisioning this voyage, which, by most measures, was an unparalleled
success. Never before had any navy in the world embarked on such a voyage,

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/6

Autumn2018Review.indb 68

2

8/6/18 8:49 AM

McMahon: The Great White Fleet Sails Today? Twenty-First-Century Logistics

69

MCMAHON

circumnavigating the globe and visiting as many countries with such a large and
powerful battle fleet.
Less known with regard to the 1907–1909 voyage is the logistics backstory.
This background demonstrates the critical importance of strategic sealift and the
ultimate vulnerability of any navy, army, or air force that is dependent on logistics
ships for fuel, stores, and ammunition. This story provides lessons that remain as
important for all the armed services of the twenty-first century as they were to the
U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century—lessons that often go unappreciated or
forgotten. While today the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. military writ large, have great
logistics capabilities through the strategic sealift managed by USTRANSCOM,
MSC, RRF, and the commercial U.S. Merchant Marine, there are serious challenges that need to be considered and overcome. The ability of America’s navy
and all its armed services to forward-deploy depends on doing so.
BACKGROUND TO THE VOYAGE
The U.S. Navy ended the Civil War with, in theory, almost seven hundred ships
in commission. This included some sixty-five ironclads. But by 1880, Navy vessels had dropped to only forty-eight in number—and all of them were essentially
technologically obsolete.6 During this period, the U.S. Merchant Marine was in
equally poor shape. To make matters worse, those shipowners who had transferred their vessels to neutral flags during the Civil War to avoid attacks from
Confederate forces were considered traitors, so Congress passed a law specifically
forbidding the reflagging of those ships back under the U.S. flag.7
Exhausted from the war and with the huge interior of their country largely
unoccupied (except by native peoples) and offering great promise, Americans
turned inward and ignored the sea, their navy, and their merchant marine. Partially contributing to the lack of interest in a sizable U.S. Merchant Marine was
the fact that by 1890 there were twenty-two coastal states and twenty-two inland
states, resulting in a decline in political support for maritime industries.8
During these years following the Civil War, industrialization spread rapidly in
the United States; American industry eclipsed that of Great Britain by the end of
the century.9 With industrialization came incredible wealth, which went to a new
class of Gilded Age businessmen but spread as well to many average Americans
and the country at large.
As the United States became more dependent on overseas trade during this
period, political leaders in Washington began to look at the decrepit state of the
Navy and the Merchant Marine. There was fear that if overseas powers threatened
seagoing trade, the United States did not possess a navy adequate to protect the
nation’s interests, much less a merchant marine capable of carrying a significant
portion of the nation’s international trade.10
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It was Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt who began to build a new and
more powerful U.S. Navy in the early 1880s. Under his leadership and that of
subsequent Navy secretaries, Congress appropriated funds for the construction
of modern cruisers.11 By 1890, six armored cruisers had been built and were
operational. During the same year, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN (later
rear admiral and President of the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island),
published his seminal book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.
In the book, Mahan argued that sea power was critical to establishing national
strength and dominance in global trade.12 (Importantly, Mahan also noted that
one of the critical attributes of sea power was a capable and robust commercial
merchant marine, although ever since Mahan first offered his thesis most in
America have overlooked this observation.)13
Mahan’s book had a tremendous impact, not just in the United States but
around the world. Huge, expensive battleships, large fleets, and decisive battles
seemed to be the order of the day. At the same time, newcomers to colonialism,
such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, clamored for overseas colonies—
if necessary, to be obtained and then protected by the force of their navies.
In the United States, the Naval Appropriations Act for 1891 (better known as
the Battleship Act of 1890) for the first time authorized the construction of three
battleships, which would be christened USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, and
USS Oregon. During the next ten years, several more battleships were completed,
bringing the U.S. Navy, by some metrics, from a ranking of twelfth among the
world’s navies in 1870 to fifth place.14
PRESIDENT TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
By the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. Navy had destroyed the Spanish fleets in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico and seized
the Philippines and Puerto Rico as possessions in a new “American Empire.” The
American navy, with its new and apparently proven ships, was the pride of the
nation.15
As luck would have it for the growth of the fleet, the political sun continued to
shine on the Navy with the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in
1901. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the early days of the war with
Spain, Roosevelt was an ardent advocate of naval power and a fervent believer in
the words of Mahan. Under his tenure as president, the Navy continued to grow
in both size and power.
World events during Roosevelt’s administration contributed to support for a
larger and more powerful navy. In 1903, the Roosevelt administration eagerly
encouraged and provided resources to rebels in Panama to help them gain independence from Colombia. The motive was ultimately to establish a treaty with a
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new Panamanian government whereby the United States could build and operate
a canal across the isthmus. This would enable the U.S. Navy to move from ocean
to ocean rapidly to deal with conflicts in Europe or Asia.16 U.S. tensions with
Japan began during these years, and the shocking defeat of the Russian fleet at
the naval battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 seemed to
prove Mahan’s theories of decisive naval battles and the need for large, powerful
battle fleets. Roosevelt and Congress grew concerned about the ability of the U.S.
Navy to protect newly acquired territories and colonies in the Pacific, notably
the Philippines.17 The launching of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 also had profound
effects on the psychology of naval strategists around the world. Dreadnought was
essentially an all-big-gun ship, and its steam-powered turbines made it fast for
battleships of the day.18 Over the course of the next three years, the world’s navies
ordered nearly seventy of these powerful—and expensive—ships.19
In 1901, the U.S. Navy possessed nine battleships, with eight more under
construction. Responding to pressure from Roosevelt and support from the
press and the public, Congress authorized the construction of an additional ten
battleships and four armored cruisers in the years from 1901 to 1905. In 1906 and
1907, two additional battleships were authorized, and in 1908 two more. By this
time, the United States had emerged as a first-rate naval power.20 In fact, in 1908,
the U.S. Navy ranked as number two in the world, second only to Great Britain’s
Royal Navy.21 (This would change in ensuing years as Germany continued its naval arms race with Britain; its navy moved from the number three to the number
two spot by the start of World War I.)
During the early 1900s, navies, and especially their battleships, became tangible and dramatic symbols of national power. Even countries that could ill afford
the cost of building and operating battleships built one or two to demonstrate
that they too were great naval powers, or at least to provide some substantive
support for the notion. The best way to show off a nation’s power was to hold
or participate in naval expositions or parades or to visit the ports of other major
naval powers. Indeed, it was a statement of respect when a nation received an
invitation to join another nation’s naval festivities, and when invitations were
received utmost attention was given to impressing others with a display of one’s
own powerful battleships.22 In this environment, President Roosevelt first conceived of sailing a USN fleet around the world.
THE VOYAGE OF THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
Roosevelt’s plan for sending America’s battle fleet around the world apparently
began to develop in 1905.23 The genesis of this idea may have been his observation
of and admiration for the epic transit of Russia’s Baltic Fleet from Saint Petersburg
to the Far East to challenge the Japanese navy in the Russo-Japanese War.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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In 1904, the tensions between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria
reached the boiling point and the two nations found themselves at war. The illtrained and ill-equipped Russian Far East Naval Squadron was no match for the
modern and highly trained Japanese navy, which, on February 8, 1904, attacked
and heavily damaged what Russian naval power was available in eastern Russia.24
In response, the tsar decided to send the entire Baltic Fleet to the Far East
to engage the Japanese, destroy their fleet, and quickly win the war—or so he
thought. But it was not to be so. The Russian fleet departed Revel (modern Tallinn, Estonia) on October 15, 1904. After a grueling 18,000-mile journey from
northern Europe to the Tsushima Strait off the coast of Japan, on May 27, 1905,
the Russian fleet engaged the Japanese. In the ensuing fierce battle most of the
Russian ships—including all the battleships—were sunk, with only a few ships
reaching Russian ports and three cruisers escaping to the Philippines.25 The war
soon came to a close. Both sides, exhausted, agreed to peace negotiations and
eventually signed a treaty—engineered by none other than President Theodore
Roosevelt—in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.26
Despite this complete disaster (from the Russian perspective), Roosevelt
was probably very impressed by the long voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet—
particularly since the world press covered it extensively during the seven-month
span. He may have been inspired to send the U.S. Navy’s battle fleet on an even
longer voyage. Then there were the unsettling tensions with Japan. Considering
Japan’s devastating defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, its growing belligerence in China and Korea, and the rapid growth of its merchant marine, Americans on the West Coast were becoming increasingly uneasy. The initial voyage
of the Great White Fleet (from the American East Coast to the West Coast) was
clearly an attempt to reassure Americans that their Navy could defend the West
Coast.27 In his autobiography, written in 1913, Roosevelt also stated that the purpose of the cruise was to “impress the American people in order to gain support
for a program to build more battleships.”28
Amid the growing tensions with Japan in the summer of 1907, it was originally
Admiral George Dewey who suggested to Roosevelt that he send the battle fleet
to the Far East as a show of force.29 Apparently during that summer Roosevelt
began to consider seriously a “world cruise” for the fleet, but he kept this idea
to himself for a time. Then, in late summer, the Roosevelt administration announced that sixteen battleships would make a voyage from the East to the West
Coast of the United States via the Strait of Magellan. In December 1907, the fleet
departed Hampton Roads, Virginia, bound for San Francisco.30 Initially this fleet
included sixteen battleships, eight armored cruisers, and six torpedo boats.31 The
officers and men of the fleet, at this point, were aware that the voyage probably
would continue around the world; the world press was still in speculative mode,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/6
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but as the weeks progressed intentions for the voyage of the Great White Fleet
became clear.32 The ships would travel from the West Coast of the United States
to New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and the Far East, then to Sri Lanka, through the
Suez Canal and the Mediterranean to Spain, and finally across the Atlantic and
back to Hampton Roads, arriving in early 1909.
This would be a 43,000-mile, around-the-globe voyage to twenty ports on
six continents. It was a world first for the large battle fleet of any nation—an accomplishment that brought envy, concern, pride, or criticism, depending on the
source.33 It was, in any case, an impressive accomplishment for a relatively young
nation and a rising naval power.
THE “REST OF THE STORY”: COAL AND STORES
The expression “An army marches on its stomach” (attributed to both Frederick
the Great and Napoléon) is well understood by most people. It seems rather
obvious that food and fuel (fodder for horses was the equivalent of the latter in
premodern times) are basic necessities if an army is to move from one point to
another. What may be less obvious is that the same is true for a navy. Granted,
some types of warships can carry substantial amounts of food, supplies, fuel, and
ammunition, but in general warships’ steaming range, and therefore their ability
to fight, is limited—often only a few days’ underway time.
The ships of the Great White Fleet were no exception. In that era, a battleship
steaming at sea speed consumed its coal supply within a week.34 Fresh water—
crucial throughout maritime history—was even more important in the age of
steam power, since steamships were dependent on liberal amounts of fresh water to resupply their boilers.35 Then there was the question of feeding warships’
crews. On the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the crew complement of the fleet
consisted of some fourteen thousand men.36 The one other often-critical commodity for warships, ammunition, was not a concern on the peacetime voyage of
the Great White Fleet—in stark contrast to the situation of the Russian fleet as it
steamed toward its fateful rendezvous in the Tsushima Strait.37
Roosevelt and Navy planners were well aware of the supply issues facing the
Great White Fleet, but the solutions were daunting and dangerous. For example,
they were aware that Admiral Dewey’s wholesale destruction of the Spanish fleet
in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy’s pursuit of the Spanish fleet off Cuba during the Spanish-American War were, in many respects, quite fortuitous because
they exposed that the Navy’s ability to resupply its combatants with coal, stores,
and ammunition during war was seriously limited and reliant on foreign-flag
merchant ships.38
Despite the massive growth in the number of USN battleships and other combatants from 1898 into the first decade of the new century, the Navy possessed
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only three U.S.-flag supply ships: USS Celtic, USS Culgoa, and USS Glacier.39 Further complicating this vulnerability at the time of the voyage of the Great White
Fleet, the Navy possessed only six old colliers (some still rigged with sails) to support the fleet on its voyage. It was estimated that the fleet would consume upward
of five hundred thousand tons of coal just on the voyage from the United States to
the Far East.40 The Russians, for example, had needed to charter sixty foreign-flag
colliers to supply their fleet on its voyage from the Baltic to the Far East.41
A study the Naval War College conducted in early 1907 estimated that the
Great White Fleet would require some one hundred chartered colliers to support
it on its voyage around the world.42 The problem was that there were no U.S.-flag
colliers to charter, because the U.S. Merchant Marine had been allowed to atrophy
during the decades after the Civil War. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior
to the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt, along with Mahan and senior Navy
officials, had advocated to Congress that a sufficient fleet of U.S.-flag colliers be
built to enable the Navy to forward-deploy. But this proposal never gained any
traction, and Congress took no action on its own to support a revitalized U.S.
Merchant Marine. Only warships, no colliers or supply ships, were authorized
and built.43
Accordingly, in October of 1907, the Navy Department—now desperately in
need of logistics ships—contracted for thirty foreign-flag colliers to supply the
Great White Fleet on its voyage from Hampton Roads to San Francisco. The majority of these were British-flag merchant ships. In an interview just after the fleet
began its voyage, contemporary German naval critic Graf Ernst zu Reventlow
underscored that “the lack of supply ships and colliers left the Americans and
the Great White Fleet in a highly vulnerable position given their dependency on
foreign flag ships, especially British ships.”44 He would be proved right. In total,
more than forty-one British merchant ships were chartered to carry coal and supplies for the Great White Fleet during the around-the-world voyage. Many other
foreign ships, mostly European, also were chartered.45 As expected, there were
many more chartered supply ships supporting the Great White Fleet than there
were warships on the voyage.46 (It is important to emphasize that any requirement
to resupply naval ordnance would have necessitated even more supply ships.)
In the Pacific, the U.S. Navy learned firsthand the dangers of becoming too dependent on foreign-flag ships to carry the fleet’s coal. During a portion of the Pacific voyage, no colliers were available to resupply the fleet. Some historians have
suggested that diplomatic tensions over a possible U.S.-German alliance against
a Japanese-British alliance caused the British to withdraw their coal ships—and
their coal—for a period. The coal was as important as the ships: during this part
of the Pacific voyage, the U.S. Navy was forced to buy Australian coal, which was
inferior in quality, requiring nearly half again as much to achieve the same output
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/6
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from the fleet’s boilers.47 Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry (the fleet commander
on the later part of the voyage) noted in subsequent congressional testimony that
this demonstrated clearly how Great Britain “could control the actions of the
fleet.”48 Exacerbating this problem, throughout the voyage there were frequent
rendezvous problems with contracted foreign-flag vessels; in some cases, they
simply never met the fleet.49
Coal was not the only commodity dependent on shipping that was less than
fully reliable. When the Great White Fleet was in the Mediterranean, an earthquake in Italy created a serious humanitarian crisis. Admiral Sperry dispatched
the U.S. supply ship USS Culgoa to assist. But the fleet depended on this one
ship for food and other supplies, so to compensate the Navy chartered a Britishflag ship, SS Republic, to bring food and supplies to the fleet while it was in the
Mediterranean. Unfortunately, Republic sank in a collision in fog with another
vessel. Fear of famine created widespread panic throughout the fleet. It was only
when the Royal Navy provided the Great White Fleet with basic rations from its
stores at Gibraltar that the crisis was averted. Additional food and supplies from
America never did arrive, but through strict rationing the fleet successfully sailed
from Gibraltar to Hampton Roads.50
On February 21, 1909, the Great White Fleet steamed majestically into Hampton Roads to a huge celebration and a proud president and nation. The U.S.
Navy had accomplished a magnificent feat, and for the most part had gained the
respect of seafaring nations across the globe.
CRITICISM, AND VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED
Even before the Great White Fleet departed on its voyage, critics noted that the
lack of a U.S. Merchant Marine limited the ability of the Navy to forward-deploy,
much less to sail around the world in a conflict situation. Senator Eugene Hale
(R-ME, 1881–1911), chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, was appalled that the magnificent battleships of the U.S. Navy were almost completely
dependent “on the indulgence of foreign powers” to forward-deploy on any voyage beyond the Atlantic Seaboard.51 In a Senate debate and congressional hearing, Senator Hale was quoted as saying that “due to the lack of U.S. flag colliers
and supply ships, the Great White Fleet was ‘as useless as a painted ship upon a
painted ocean.’”52
The fact that the Great White Fleet was almost completely dependent on having foreign-flag commercial ships, especially of the British merchant marine,
available to follow the fleet around the world to resupply it was not revealed fully
until after the fleet had returned to the United States.53 Indeed, it is curious that
during the period of the voyage the Germans had been hoping to establish an
alliance between their country and the United States for a possible war against
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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Japan and Britain. What the Germans apparently did not consider is that the size
and capability of the U.S. Navy mattered not, because without sufficient USN
logistics ships and an American merchant marine capable of resupplying the
fleet, any U.S. naval contribution to a war against Japan and Britain would have
been negligible.54
With the successful return of the Great White Fleet to the United States, the
Navy enjoyed substantial support from the public, Congress, and the press. That
said, the voyage exposed significant vulnerabilities in the Navy and its ability to
project power around the world. As Scientific American noted, “We refer to our
great shortage of colliers and to the fact that had it not been for the foreign bottoms in which coal was shipped to the fleet at various points of rendezvous, it
would have been impossible for this voyage to have been made. . . . [In a wartime
setting] with no colliers of our own available to carry the necessary fuel, our sixteen battleships would have been as useless as so many anchored.”55
Following the return of the fleet in 1909, Congress became fully aware of
the serious lack of U.S.-flag colliers and supply ships and the Navy’s absolute
dependence on foreign-flag merchant ships to deploy on voyages beyond the
continental United States. This shortage obviously rendered the Navy impotent
in potential conflicts far from U.S. shores. In a March 20, 1908, Senate debate
on a shipping bill amending the 1891 Act to Provide for Ocean Mail Service between the United States and Foreign Ports, and to Promote Commerce, Senator
Newlands of Nevada noted that the War Industries Board had been consulted
regarding the needs of the U.S. Navy in case of a war. The board indicated that
“about 232 commercial ships and/or auxiliaries would be needed to use as scouts,
transports, colliers, and dispatch boats.” Senator Newlands commented that “we
all know we have no such merchant marine as well as such supply ships.”56
Through the course of several congressional hearings and debates after the
voyage of the Great White Fleet, it was acknowledged that a sizable U.S. Merchant
Marine was critical to national security, and yet Congress took little action until
the eve of World War I to support a commercial merchant marine. In the absence
of a robust U.S. Merchant Marine, and realizing the critical vulnerability the lack
of logistics ships and commercial vessels represented, the Navy in 1908, with
the consent of Congress, allocated 59 percent of its ship-construction budget to
building a new fleet of Navy colliers and supply ships.57
AMERICA’S TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NAVY—
LESSONS LEARNED OR FORGOTTEN?
One hundred twenty-five years after the publication of Mahan’s Influence of Sea
Power upon History and 110 years after the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the
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Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
issued in 2015, stated in part:
Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, providing the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the
free flow of goods, protecting U.S. natural resources, promoting stability, deterring
conflict, and responding to aggression. As global maritime commerce expands, populations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced
military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will
challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions.
The American people will continue to rely on the Sea Services to respond to fastchanging and complex world events that threaten the security of the United States
and our allies and partners.58

Although international objectives may have changed, the importance of sea
power that Mahan formulated has not diminished. In fact, given the rapid growth
of navies around the world over the last twenty years, there is little question that
great world powers are as eager today to possess large and powerful navies as nations were more than a century ago. It can be argued that currently there is under
way a naval arms race much like that which occurred in the early years of the
twentieth century. For decades after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had
no near-peer competitor; this situation has changed considerably in recent years
with the rapid growth of navies around the world.
Unfortunately, it seems that many operational strategists and planners have
almost forgotten some of the lessons learned from the voyage of the Great White
Fleet regarding fleet logistics. This is especially true when it comes to realizing the
importance of a U.S. Merchant Marine in deploying all the armed forces around
the world, including the Navy, as Mahan discussed. The coal-burning battleships
of the Great White Fleet required refueling after one to two weeks’ steaming
time, depending on voyage speed. Yes, today’s nuclear-powered carriers and
submarines can steam for decades without refueling, but gas turbine–powered
destroyers and cruisers require fuel nearly as often as coal-burning steamships
did, and much more often if they are engaged in combat operations. In addition,
maintaining combat air operations requires a carrier to replenish jet fuel at least
every five days.59 Simply put, Navy combatants today are as dependent on logistics ships as their predecessors were during the voyage of the Great White Fleet.
TODAY’S STRATEGIC SEALIFT/LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES
To keep warships and land and air forces forward deployed and capable of
fighting, the military today has an asset that did not exist a century ago:
TRANSCOM. One of its component commands, Military Sealift Command,
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provides logistics sealift for all the armed services. MSC’s mission is clear: “Military Sealift Command exists to support the joint warfighter across the full spectrum of military operations. Our mission is timeless and essential. Regardless of
the challenge, we prevail! Working seamlessly with key partners to master the
maritime and cyber domains, MSC provides on-time logistics, strategic sealift,
as well as specialized missions anywhere in the world, under any condition, 24/7,
365 days a year.”60
MSC is a capable, well-organized, and efficient organization with numerous
missions. Supporting all the armed forces, MSC operates nearly 130 ships around
the world. MSC ships are divided into eight mission sets: fleet oilers, special
mission, prepositioning, service support, sealift, fleet ordnance and dry cargo,
afloat staging, and expeditionary fast transport. Specifically to provide Navy
fleet-logistics support around the world, MSC operates fifteen fleet oilers and
fourteen fleet ordnance and dry-cargo ships. Other MSC ships support the Army
and Air Force and other essential military missions not related to supplying Navy
ships.61 MSC government-owned, U.S. Naval Service ships are crewed by civilian,
government-employee mariners. Many other MSC vessels are commercial merchant ships chartered to provide logistics support for all U.S. armed forces around
the world. These ships are crewed by civilian, union mariners.
The Maritime Administration (part of the U.S. Department of Transportation)
has complementary government and commercial strategic sealift capabilities to
support all the armed forces. MARAD’s primary government sealift asset is the
RRF, which consists of forty-six former merchant ships: thirty-five roll-on/roll-off
(RO/RO) vessels, eight of which are fast sealift support vessels; two heavy-lift or
barge-carrying ships; six auxiliary crane ships; one tanker; and two aviation-repair
vessels. These ships are dedicated to strategic sealift, and when activated in times
of national emergency they fall under the operational control of MSC. RRF ships
are berthed at various U.S. ports. Each is expected to be fully operational within
its assigned five- or ten-day readiness status, thence to sail to designated loading berths. Through competitive contracts, commercial U.S. ship-management
companies provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support,
activation, and operations management for RRF vessels. American civilian mariners contracted through maritime labor unions constitute the crews.62
MARAD’s commercial sealift capability also includes managing the Maritime
Security Program (MSP), which provides an annual operating subsidy for sixty
commercial cargo ships under the U.S. flag. This program supports an active,
privately owned, U.S.-flag and U.S.-crewed liner fleet in international trade,
which becomes available to support Department of Defense (DoD) sustainment
operations when necessary. The MSP facilitates maintenance of a base labor pool
of approximately 2,400 American mariners available to crew government and
commercial ships in times of peace and war.63
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Finally, MARAD also oversees the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
(VISA) program. The VISA program is a partnership between the U.S. government and the maritime industry to provide DoD with “assured access” to
commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support routine and emergency
deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces. The VISA program enables
DoD to benefit from the maximum use of a modern, global logistics network
and intermodal capabilities, including dry-cargo ships, shoreside equipment,
terminal facilities, and intermodal management services. All MSP ships are part
of the VISA program.64
The global strategic sealift capability of the U.S. military through
USTRANSCOM’s MSC and MARAD and the programs these organizations
administer is, indeed, impressive, and is unmatched by any other nation. These
entities’ efficiency and effectiveness have been proved in countless U.S. military
deployments; the battle testing they received during Operations E NDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM was especially significant.
However, compliments aside, there is growing concern that the strategic sealift
(logistics) nightmares the Navy faced during the voyage of the Great White Fleet
could affect similarly (i.e., negatively) not only the deployment and readiness of
USN combatants but the forward deployment of all U.S. armed forces, traceable
to some of the same factors the Great White Fleet experienced.
Clearly the strategic sealift capabilities of the U.S. military in general, and the
U.S. Navy in particular, are greatly superior to those of the U.S. Navy of a century
ago. However, the size of the American fleet, the missions of the U.S. Navy and
the military as a whole, and the degree of forward deployment of U.S. forces also
are vastly greater and more complicated than they were a century ago. As impressive as the voyage of the Great White Fleet was, it pales in comparison with what
the U.S. military does every day around the world in the current era. In other
words, although the strategic sealift capabilities of the United States are impressive, so too are the demands on and potential challenges to the capabilities of the
logistics system that supports the Navy and the military as a whole.
For decades, the U.S. Navy has faced no capable competitors as it sailed the
seven seas. For decades, USN task forces and ships have engaged in combat operations around the world, with no serious threat from other forces. For decades,
U.S. military strategic sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial,
could sail throughout the world with no threat of attack from an enemy. Now
this situation has changed completely. Today, enemy threats on logistics ships
abound, whether in the form of kinetic strikes or a loss of control and incapacitation from cyber-warfare attacks. There are other challenges as well, some of
which are discussed in the sections that follow.
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Lack of a Sizable U.S. Merchant Marine
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s most famous work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, drew from a series of lectures he gave at the Naval War
College. In the book he concluded that merchant shipping was both a source of
maritime power and something that navies naturally needed to defend.65 As if
to prove Mahan’s point, shortly after the book’s publication, during the SpanishAmerican War, the United States found itself without the commercial shipping it
needed to support the U.S. Navy. In fact, it was necessary to charter and purchase
foreign-flag ships to resupply U.S. fleets during the war, and only serendipity
enabled the United States to do so.66
The lack of a sizable U.S. Merchant Marine for economic and strategic sealift manifested itself again at the outbreak of World War I. European belligerents removed their vessels from U.S. trade, which seriously damaged the U.S.
economy.67 Recurrence of the same problem in World War II was partially
avoided by the vision of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration and Congress,
which enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This legislation initiated a massive buildup of commercial shipyards and the construction of huge numbers of
U.S.-flag merchant ships.68
Today, there are more than ninety thousand commercial ships in the world, a
majority of which are engaged in global deep-sea trade.69 (This figure does not
include hundreds of thousands of inland commercial vessels.) The nation owning
and controlling the most merchant ships is China, with more than 5,400 vessels
registered, mostly in China (and Hong Kong), but with hundreds of other Chinese ships registered in flag-of-convenience (FOC) nations.70 The United States
has only eighty-one merchant ships in international trade under the U.S. flag.
The majority of these ships are operated by U.S. companies that are subsidiaries
of larger shipping companies that are owned and located in other nations, such as
Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, and France. (Sixty of these ships are supported
through MARAD’s MSP.)71
The question is whether in a global conflict involving the United States there
would be enough U.S.-flag ships to support the U.S. armed forces, including the
U.S. Navy. The answer is: possibly. However, the crux of the problem is this: if, in
a contested environment, U.S.-flag shipping experienced casualties, there is no
reserve of commercial, U.S.-flag ships on which to call; there is no “bench,” so to
speak. Could the United States rely on foreign ships registered in other countries
and crewed by foreign nationals? If there were no MSC or other commercial,
U.S.-flag vessels available, could the U.S. Navy rely on foreign-flag ships to resupply a task force? Possibly yes—but quite possibly no. So, if foreign-flag ships and
crews were not available because of particular circumstances (and one can think
of many combinations of factors that would have that effect), the U.S. military
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very quickly would be immobilized, rendered incapable of carrying on a fight far
from U.S. shores. The Navy of today would be in the same position as the Great
White Fleet more than a century ago.
Today, USN task forces are resupplied by the fifteen fleet oilers and fourteen
ordnance and dry-cargo ships that MSC operates. These ships draw fuel and
supplies from various depots around the world, in both U.S. and foreign ports.
Depots in the United States are supplied by U.S.-flag merchant vessels; depots
in other countries are supplied by both U.S.- and foreign-flag ships. However,
there are only six U.S.-flag product tankers to supply fuel for the entire U.S. Navy
around the world.72 There are no other U.S.-flag tankers in international trade,
and very few, if any, other product tankers in domestic trade that could be used in
an emergency. In a manner similar to its practice during the voyage of the Great
White Fleet, the Navy today frequently relies on foreign-flag tankers and cargo
ships to carry Navy fuel and supplies because of the limited number of U.S.-flag
merchant ships.73
In a contested environment, if one or more of the limited number of MSC
or U.S.-flag merchant ships were taken out of action by kinetic or cyber means,
would there be a work-around? Quite possibly no.
Inability to Protect Logistics Ships
There is great concern about the Navy’s ability to protect logistics ships, both
government owned and commercial. Of course, the U.S. Navy has substantial
war-fighting capabilities; however, the Navy’s fleet of combatant ships currently
(in 2018) numbers 272 ships and submarines, and these vessels already have
multiple war-fighting missions that stretch the capabilities of the fleet substantially.74 In a 2014 congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy
commander of TRANSCOM was asked about the ability of the Navy to protect
logistics ships. He replied as follows: “So in terms of protecting ships as they go
across [the ocean] we—just so you know—we don’t have a lot of attrition built
into our modeling. So we . . . that’s not something we build in there.” In other
words, although the United States has substantial strategic sealift capability, even
modestly successful kinetic or cyber attacks on MSC, RRF, or MSP/VISA merchant ships could have far-reaching consequences for the Navy and the military’s
ability to forward-deploy and conduct combat operations.75 Simply put, currently
no doctrine is in place to protect merchant shipping, and protection for strategic
sealift vessels is not factored adequately into U.S. policies or plans.
Nonavailability of U.S. Mariners
During the numerous conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there
have been no examples of U.S.-flag carriers refusing to offer their ships in times
of national emergency. Similarly, there have been no examples of American
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merchant mariners refusing to enter contested environments and thereby preventing U.S.-flag ships from serving the military. Quite to the contrary, U.S. merchant mariners have served with distinction in all U.S. conflicts. During World
War II, for example, nearly six thousand U.S. merchant mariners were killed or
lost at sea. This represents the greatest percentage loss of any U.S. service during
the war.76 (One in twenty-six mariners serving on U.S. merchant ships during the
war died in the line of duty.)77
Some have suggested that foreign ships and mariners might be available to
serve the logistics needs of the military in a U.S. conflict. However, there is no
guarantee this would work. Despite the relatively benign environment of the Persian Gulf during the Gulf Wars, chartered foreign-flag ships and crews did refuse,
on occasion, to deliver U.S. military cargoes.78 There are many political scenarios
under which foreign vessels and their crews would be prohibited by their governments from supporting the U.S. military.
Clearly, the availability of experienced U.S. mariners is crucial for crewing the
RRF, MSC commercial merchant ships on charter, and U.S.-flag ships in the MSP
and VISA programs that are supporting military sealift. However, ensuring such
availability in a future national emergency would require that there be an adequate pool of available mariners. Just as important, there also must be a pipeline
of younger mariners entering the commercial maritime workforce throughout
the years ahead. All this can happen only if there is a stable U.S. Merchant Marine
with a number of jobs adequate to ensure employment.
However, because of the shrinking number of commercial ships and commercial seagoing billets, it has become increasingly difficult for younger mariners to
gain the sea time and experience necessary to raise the level of their commercial
licenses and to sail in positions of higher responsibility.79 As the U.S. Merchant
Marine continues to decline, the number of available jobs in the industry also
decreases. Senior leaders at TRANSCOM and MARAD are deeply concerned
that the military readiness of the United States is currently at risk because the declining number of U.S.-flag commercial ships means the pool of available, experienced mariners continues to get smaller.80 At the present time, it is questionable
whether there would be enough American mariners available during a conflict—
particularly a long one—and the picture grows bleaker with each passing year.81
Effectively U.S. Controlled Ships Dwindling
Ships owned by Americans and U.S. interests but flagged in other countries,
particularly FOC countries, have been termed effectively U.S. controlled (EUSC)
ships. The theory is that these vessels would be available to the United States in
times of national emergency. Expecting and relying on the availability of EUSC
shipping constituted a long-standing policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1989,
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for example, President George H. W. Bush signed a National Security Sealift
Policy that reiterated the importance of EUSC shipping as part of the military’s
strategic sealift capability.82
However, the problems with relying on EUSC shipping are twofold. First,
while the owners of EUSC ships theoretically might be willing to support the
United States in a national emergency, there is no guarantee that the flag states
of those EUSC vessels would allow them to be used to support U.S. interests
or objectives. For example, Panama has the largest number of merchant ships
registered under its flag. China owns 534 vessels under the Panamanian flag.83
A Chinese company operates the two major marine terminals on the ends of
the Panama Canal, and the Chinese have numerous other business interests in
Panama.84 For these reasons, the Panamanian government might be reluctant to
allow the United States to use any vessel under Panamanian registry in a conflict
between the United States and China. Further, EUSC vessels are crewed by foreign nationals, not Americans, and there is no guarantee that foreign crews would
be willing to serve on EUSC vessels in a U.S. conflict.
In any case, because of U.S. tax laws passed in 1979 and 1986, American owners of EUSC ships no longer can avoid paying taxes on their incomes. As a result,
the number of EUSC ships has dwindled dramatically in the decades since.85
Because there are fewer American citizens involved in EUSC shipping than in
the past, it is no longer a viable source of ships for the American military in times
of national emergency.86 Compounding this problem, of the vessels owned by
Americans and registered in other countries, the proportion that are militarily
useful is very small.
Aging of the Fleet
Companies that participate in and receive funds through MARAD’s MSP are required to keep relatively new ships in the program. This does not pose a particularly onerous burden, since the participants’ parent companies (the vast majority
of which are foreign owned) maintain large fleets of modern ships under other
flags of registry. MSP operators are encouraged to replace aging MSP vessels with
newer ships, and must replace them before they reach age-out limits defined in
the MSP. This keeps newer vessels composing the MSP-VISA fleet.
The situation with the Ready Reserve Force is quite different. RRF vessels
are largely foreign-built vessels, plus some U.S.-built vessels constructed and
operated commercially in the late 1970s and early ’80s. Some RRF vessels are
even older, with a few (such as the fast sealift vessels, former Sealand Services
vessels) approaching and exceeding fifty years of age. Although well maintained
by MARAD and the companies contracted to manage them, these formerly commercial RRF ships were not designed and built for half-century life cycles.
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For MSC and MARAD to maintain the state of readiness necessary to provide
emergency strategic sealift, it is critical to have a solid and continually wellfunded vessel-replacement program in place. Yet current budget constraints
make this a daunting challenge. This puts at extreme risk the ability of MSC and
MARAD to provide logistics ships for strategic sealift for all U.S. armed forces,
including the U.S. Navy.
In a report delivered to the Secretary of the Navy in 1946, Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King noted, “Whatever else [World War II] is, so far as the United States is concerned, it has been a war of logistics.”87
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the U.S. Transportation Command. With its component commands of AMC, SDDC, and MSC,
USTRANSCOM fully integrated the military’s transportation modes, so that for
the first time in history the U.S. military operated all its military transportation
resources under a single command.88 TRANSCOM soon proved its worth in
1990–91 with the buildup and war against Iraq in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM, which together constituted one of the largest logistics deployments in
history.89 TRANSCOM and its components have proved their efficiency and effectiveness continually since that time, most notably in Operations ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
The voyage of the Great White Fleet of 1907–1909 demonstrated the emerging capabilities of the U.S. Navy and proved that the United States quickly was
becoming a great world power. But it also revealed the critical importance of
logistics and logistics ships in keeping a navy supplied in any forward-deployed
situation. Although the voyage was completed successfully, there were many
challenges and logistics near disasters during the voyage. This primarily was owing to the lack of U.S. logistics ships and the lack of a substantial U.S. Merchant
Marine capable of supporting the U.S. Navy—and this was a peaceful operation,
facing no threats from an enemy navy. The U.S. Navy and Congress learned from
this voyage and, at least for a time, placed emphasis on developing Navy logistics
capabilities using U.S.-flag ships. But these lessons had to be relearned in World
War I and in the years leading up to World War II.
Given the massive responsibilities the U.S. military shoulders around the
world today, it faces challenges similar to those the Great White Fleet faced more
than a century ago—but on a much larger scale. As able and efficient as MSC,
MARAD’s RRF, and the MSP/VISA fleets are, their capabilities were developed to
operate at sea in an uncontested environment. None of the vessels in these fleets
are capable of self-defense.
But the continuation of a benign environment on the seas of the world no
longer can be assumed. In today’s world, in a conflict involving the United States,
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sea lines of communication may pass through contested waters, and U.S. strategic
sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial, may be attacked. World
powers are building and operating powerful navies and intense cyber-attack
capabilities. Even if the Navy were to develop doctrines and strategies to protect
sealift ships, the number of USN warships available to protect logistics ships is
very limited at best. In some scenarios, it would be next to impossible for the
Navy to protect logistics ships in a heavily contested environment.
In the early years of World War II, the Germans had the ability to deploy only
one to two dozen submarines at any one time. Yet because defense of merchant
vessels supporting the British economy and war effort was inadequate or nonexistent, the Germans nonetheless were able to sink six million tons of British
shipping from 1939 to 1941.90 This represented more than 1,400 ships sunk by
a small fleet of German submarines.91 The naval resources needed to defeat the
German submarine threat in the Battle of the Atlantic ultimately were staggering,
running into the hundreds of billions in today’s dollars.92
In the Pacific, the Japanese did not mount an effective defense of their logistics ships or their merchant marine. Their lack of doctrine and maritime trade–
warfare defense enabled the U.S. Navy to destroy more than eight million tons of
Japanese logistics and merchant marine vessels, virtually eviscerating the Japanese economy and war machine and starving the nation.93
In other words, without sufficient protection of logistics and U.S.-flag merchant ships today, losses from an even modestly capable enemy could be substantial. The problem is compounded by the limited numbers of MSC, RRF, and
MSP ships available and of American mariners to crew them. The loss of one or
more of the twenty large, medium-speed, RO/RO (LMSR) vessels in MSC’s fleet
(each of which has a capacity of between 290,000 and 380,000 square feet of cargo
space) would have catastrophic effects on a U.S. Army deployment that depended
on the timely arrival of supplies and equipment.94 The loss of one or more of the
six American commercial tankers on charter to MSC or the fifteen MSC fleet
oilers or fourteen MSC ordnance and dry-cargo ships could devastate Navy resupply of one or more task forces. The same would be the case if the foreign-flag
tankers on which MSC depends no longer were available.
The logistical issues and the lack of USN logistics and American commercial
merchant ships nearly paralyzed the around-the-world voyage of the Great White
Fleet and provided powerful and enduring lessons that need to be looked at with
fresh eyes today. In his 1908 congressional testimony, Senator Newlands noted
that “[i]n case of war these fighting ships would, without an auxiliary navy [i.e.,
logistics ships], be absolutely derelict in the ocean, unable to move. Our Navy
may be compared to a man with strong lungs and a strong heart, perfect organs,
without legs or arms. . . . We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that
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is perfect in every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary
for fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the
fighting.”95
This observation is just as true today as in 1908, and not just for the Navy but
for the entire U.S. military.

NOTES

1.	Arthur J. Lichte [Gen., USAF], “Strategic Air
Mobility and Global Power Projection,” Joint
Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008), p. 39.

13. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea
Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1890), pp. 26–29.

2.	A measurement ton is a volume measurement
equal to forty cubic feet.

14. Miller, The U.S. Navy, pp. 154–55.

3.	
American Merchant Marine at War, www
.usmm.org/.
4.	James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many,
So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment
for Operation DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1996), p. 11.
5.	Since the late fifteenth century, European
powers had established “empires” around
the world. However, these were mostly for
mercantile purposes. It was in the nineteenth
century that most of the world was carved
up by European countries—notably Great
Britain, France, and Germany—into governed
empires and spheres of influence.
6.	Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy: A History (New
York: Quill, 1990), pp. 143–44.
7.	Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The
Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States
Maritime Policy (Columbia: Univ. of South
Carolina Press, 2000), p. 73.
8.	Rodney Carlisle, Rough Waters: Sovereignty
and the American Merchant Flag (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), p. 57.
9.	Angus Maddison, quoted in “Hello America,”
The Economist, August 16, 2010, www
.economist.com/.
10. Miller, The U.S. Navy, p. 148.
11. Ibid., pp. 149, 151.
12. Robert A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: Its
Voyage around the World, 1907–1909 Boston:
Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 9–10.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/6

Autumn2018Review.indb 86

15. Kenneth Wimmel, Theodore Roosevelt and the
Great White Fleet: American Sea Power Comes
of Age (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998),
p. 155.
16. Miller, The U.S. Navy, pp. 168–69.
17. James R. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great
White Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1988), pp. 5–6.
18. Battleships built before Dreadnought carried a
variety of guns of various calibers.
19. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet,
p. 5.
20. Gordon Carpenter O’Gara, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943).
21. Fred T. Jane, Fighting Ships (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1908), p. 23.
22. Hart, The Great White Fleet, pp. 19–22.
23. Ibid., p. 23.
24. Constantine Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 34.
25. Ibid., pp. 310, 312.
26. Henry J. Hendrix, Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval
Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the
American Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2009), pp. 129–31.
27. Samuel Carter, The Incredible Great White
Fleet (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1970), pp.
10–11.
28. Wimmel, Theodore Roosevelt and the Great
White Fleet, p. 221.

20

8/6/18 8:49 AM

McMahon: The Great White Fleet Sails Today? Twenty-First-Century Logistics

29. Ibid., p. 220.

50. Hart, The Great White Fleet, pp. 289–90.

30. Ibid., pp. 222–23.

51. Ibid., p. 55.

31. James R. Holmes, “‘A Striking Thing’: Leadership, Strategic Communications, and Roose
velt’s Great White Fleet,” Naval War College
Review 61, no. 1 (Winter 2008), p. 51.

52. 42 Cong. Rec., p. S3635 (daily ed. March 20,
1908) (statement of Senator Hale). The epigraph at the beginning of the article is drawn
from this record.

32. Carter, The Incredible Great White Fleet, pp.
78–79.

53. In the United Kingdom since World War
I, the British merchant marine has been
referred to as the British Merchant Navy.

33. Michael J. Crawford, ed., The World Cruise of
the Great White Fleet: Honoring 100 Years of
Global Partnerships and Security (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 2008), p. 6.

54. Hart, The Great White Fleet, p. 55.

34. Hart, The Great White Fleet, p. 18.

55. “Lessons and Results of the Battleship Cruise,”
Scientific American 100, no. 8 (February 20,
1909), p. 146.

35. This was before the invention of evaporators,
which convert seawater into fresh water.

56. 42 Cong. Rec., p. S3633 (daily ed. March 20,
1908) (statement of Senator Newlands).

36. Crawford, The World Cruise of the Great
White Fleet, p. 6.

57. Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 91.

37. Because of its inability to resupply ordnance,
the Russian fleet was unable to engage in the
necessary target practice en route from the
Russian Baltic to the Far East. This was probably a factor in its decisive defeat.
38. Frank Allston, Ready for Sea: The Bicentennial
History of the U.S. Navy Supply Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp.
127–28.
39. Ibid., p. 144.
40. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S.
Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 90.
41. Peter V. Nash, The Development of Mobile
Logistic Support in Anglo-American Naval
Policy, 1900–1953 (Gainesville: Univ. Press of
Florida, 2009), p. 16.
42.	Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 90.
43. Hendrix, Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy, p. 19.
44. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet,
p. 17.
45. Carter, The Incredible Great White Fleet, p. 13.
46. Hart, The Great White Fleet, p. 55.
47. Ibid., pp. 198–99; Miller, War Plan Orange,
pp. 89–90.
48. Hart, The Great White Fleet, pp. 198–99.
49. Nash, The Development of Mobile Logistic
Support, p. 16.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 87

87

MCMAHON

58. J. F. Dunford, J. W. Greenert, and P. F. Zu
kunft, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,”
March 2015, p. iii, available at www.navy.mil/.
59. Representatives of USN Carrier Strike Group
4 and staff members of the Wargaming
Department, Naval War College, interview by
author, August 10, 2017. During Operation
DESERT STORM, the conventionally powered
carriers in the Persian Gulf replenished aviation fuel every 2.7 to 3 days. USS Roosevelt,
the only nuclear-powered carrier in the
DESERT STORM air campaign that was also
operating in the Persian Gulf, replenished
its aviation fuel about every 3.3 days. Navy
Aircraft Carriers: Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers,
NSIAD-98-1 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, August 27, 1998), p. 67.
60. “About MSC—Mission,” Military Sealift Command, www.msc.navy.mil/.
61. “Ship Inventory,” Military Sealift Command,
www.msc.navy.mil/.
62. “Ships & Shipping—the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force,” MARAD,
www.marad.dot.gov/.
63. U.S. Transportation Dept., “The Maritime
Security Program: Meeting National Sealift
Needs,” MARAD, www.marad.dot.gov/.
64. “Ships & Shipping—Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement (VISA),” MARAD, www
.marad.dot.gov/.

21

8/6/18 8:49 AM

88

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 6

65. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. (Abingdon,
U.K.: Routledge, 2009), p. 100.

76. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea
Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford,
CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 272.

66. Gibson and Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean,
pp. 91–93.

77. “Casualties,” American Merchant Marine at
War, www.usmm.org/.

67. Jeffrey Safford, “World War I Maritime Policy
and the National Security, 1914–1919,” in
America’s Maritime Legacy: A History of
the U.S. Merchant Marine and Shipbuilding
Industry since Colonial Times, ed. Robert A.
Kilmarx (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), pp.
118–48, quoted in Gibson and Donovan, The
Abandoned Ocean, p. 104.

78. 142 Cong. Rec., p. S10972 (daily ed. September 19, 1996).

68. “Watery Grave? What Will Happen to the
American Fleet?,” Time, September 13, 1943,
p. 82.
69. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), Review of Marine
Transport 2013, UNCTAD/RMT/2013
(2013), p. 30.
70. James Kynge et al., “How China Rules the
Waves,” Financial Times, January 12, 2017,
ig.ft.com/. A flag-of-convenience country is
one that, for a fee, encourages registration
of ships in that nation. Shipowners benefit
by avoiding taxes, lowering crew wages and
related costs, reducing liability, and avoiding
some onerous regulations. Examples of FOCs
include those of Panama, Liberia, and the
Marshall Islands. More than 50 percent of the
world’s merchant ships are registered in FOC
nations.
71. “Maritime Security Program,” MARAD, www
.marad.dot.gov/.
72. A product tanker is a tank vessel designed to
carry refined petroleum products such as jet
fuel, diesel fuel, and gasoline.
73. “Ships—Sealift,” Military Sealift Command,
www.msc.navy.mil/.
74. “Navy Ships,” in “2017 Almanac,” special
issue, Seapower 60, no. 1 (January 2017), pp.
14–36.
75. Logistics and Sealift Force Requirements and
Force Structure Assessment: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Seapower and Projection
Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Services,
113th Cong., p. 20 (July 30, 2014) (statement
of William A. Brown [VAdm., USN], Deputy
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command).

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/6

Autumn2018Review.indb 88

79. In the United States, it is the U.S. Coast Guard
that issues seagoing licenses and certifications. Licensing and certifications for deepsea commercial vessels require many years
of sea time in lower positions and numerous
exams for a seafarer to rise to the rank of
captain or chief engineer.
80. Jim Garamone, “Transportation Command
Chief Expresses Concern about Trends,”
Department of Defense, March 15, 2016,
www.defense.gov/; Chris Dupin, “MARAD
Executive Director Says Concern Exists over
Mariner Shortage,” American Shipper, April
11, 2017, www.americanshipper.com/.
81. Hearings on the State of the Command Before
the H. Armed Services Comm., 115th Cong.,
p. 16 (March 30, 2017) (statement of Darren
W. McDew [Gen., USAF], Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command).
82. Henry S. Marcus et al., “Increasing the Size
of the Effective United States Control Fleet”
(unpublished final report, produced under
the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, August 2002), p. ii.
83. “China Merchant Marine,” IndexMundi, www
.indexmundi.com/.
84. Yojiro Konno, with Nancy Menges, “China’s
Control of the Panama Canal Revisited,”
Menges’ Americas Report (blog), October 6,
2008, themengesproject.blogspot.com/.
85. Marcus et al., “Increasing the Size of the Effective United States Control Fleet,” p. ii.
86. Ibid., pp. ii–iii, vi.
87. “Logistics Quotations: Posted by Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP),” Air
University, www.au.af.mil/.
88. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So
Far, So Fast, p. 11.
89. Ibid., p. 12.
90. Geoffrey Till, “The Battle of the Atlantic as
History,” chap. 34 in The Battle of the Atlantic

22

8/6/18 8:49 AM

McMahon: The Great White Fleet Sails Today? Twenty-First-Century Logistics

1939–1945: The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference, ed. Stephen Howarth
and Derek Law (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), p. 589.
91. Philip Pugh, “Military Need and Civil Necessity,” chap. 1 in The Battle of the Atlantic
1939–1945, ed. Howarth and Law, p. 31.
92. Michael T. Poirier [Cdr., USN], “Results
of the German and American Submarine
Campaigns of World War II,” Chief of Naval
Operations, Submarine Warfare Division,
October 20, 1999, archive.li/.
93. Milan Vego, Maritime Trade Warfare (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, July 2015),
p. 30.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 89

MCMAHON

89

94. Each Watson-class LMSR, for example, can
carry an entire U.S. Army armor task force,
including fifty-eight tanks and forty-eight
other tracked vehicles, plus more than nine
hundred trucks, other wheeled vehicles, and
equipment and supplies. “T-AKR USNS Bob
Hope,” GlobalSecurity.org; “United States
Navy Fact File: Large, Medium-Speed, RollOn / Roll-Off Ships T-AKR,” America’s Navy,
www.navy.mil/.
95. 42 Cong. Rec., p. S3629 (daily ed. March
20, 1908). The senators were debating S.28,
“Shipping Bill,” to amend the March 3,
1891, Act to Provide for Ocean Mail Service
between the United States and Foreign Ports,
and to Promote Commerce.

23

8/6/18 8:49 AM

